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The most influential recent work on the determinants of 
civil wars found the factors associated with the grievance 
motivation to be largely irrelevant.  Our paper subjects 
the results of this empirical work to further scrutiny 
by embedding the study of civil war in a more general 
analysis of varieties of violent contestation of political 
power within the borders of the state. Such an approach, 
we argue, will have important implications for how we 
think theoretically about the occurrence of domestic 
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war as well as how we specify our empirical tests.  In 
the empirical model, the manifestation of domestic 
conflict range from low intensity violence and coups 
to civil war. Our multinomial specification of domestic 
conflict supports the hypothesis that diversity accentuates 
distributional conflict and thus increases the risk of civil 
war.  We also find that democracies may be more efficient 
than autocracies in reducing the risk of civil war. 
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 “The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or 
religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency.  These include poverty, 
which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment, political 
instability, rough terrain, and large populations.”  (Fearon and Laitin 2003) 
 
“Political and social variables that are most obviously related to grievances have little explanatory 
power.  By contrast, economic variables, which could proxy some grievance but are perhaps more 
obviously related to the viability of rebellion, provide considerably more explanatory power.” 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004)  
 
1. Introduction 
The above citations epitomize the position of the recent academic scholarship on the determinants of 
civil war onset, especially with regard to the role of social fractionalization.   While Fearon and Laitin 
fail to find any robustly significant association between social fractionalization and the hazard of civil 
war, Collier and Hoeffler results are even more striking.   They find that, when controlling for ethnic 
dominance, social fractionalization actually reduces such risk.  Moreover, according to the recent 
literature, the other notable insignificant factor is democracy.  In general, grievance motives of the 
onset of civil wars (ethnic / religious fractionalization, democracy / autocracy) have received only 
weak and inconsistent support in the literature.  Instead, and despite the very different theoretical 
underpinnings adopted by the above two leading research teams, their empirical findings are broadly 
similar with regard to the role of non-grievance factors.  A high risk of civil war was found to be 
robustly associated with low and stagnating income, high dependence on natural resources and other 
insurgency promoting environmental and demographic factors, such as high and sparsely dispersed 
population or rough geographic terrain.    
Despite what appears to be compelling empirical evidence, there is hardly a consensus, partly 
because the evidence is at odds with a large body of theoretical literature, as well as with the 
conventional wisdom held by politicians and journalists.
1  Moreover, civil wars are far too important 
for the scientific and development community to close the debate on the causes of civil conflict and 
some strands of the empirical literature attempt to subject this evidence to further scrutiny.  For 
example, focusing on identity wars only, Sambanis 2001 finds a significant and positive effect for 
ethnic heterogeneity.  Other research looks into the mechanics of how ethnic and religious factors 
should work: for example, whether we should expect ethnic and religious factors to affect conflict 
through polarization or fractionalization; and ethnic polarization was found to be robustly associated 
with increased risks of both prevalence and onset of civil wars (Reynal-Querol 2002).  Finally, 
Sambanis 2004 relates the lack of robustness of the findings on ethnic fractionalization to different 
definitions of what constitutes a war, the inclusion or exclusion of observations from on-going civil 
                                                 
1 See Cederman and Girardin 2007 and the review of the culturalist perspective in Fearon and Laitin 2003.     3
wars, different time periods of data availability, and the unreliability of (imputed) data for some of 
the newly established states.   
Against this backdrop our paper constitutes a major departure from the prevailing empirical and 
theoretical literature.  We take a different and, to our best knowledge, a new line of inquiry, which 
embeds the study of civil war in a more general analysis of varieties of violent conflicts within the 
borders of the state.  Empirically, other possible manifestations of irregular and violent contestation 
of political power are coups and riots or low intensity conflict.  Our approach, we argue, will have 
important implications for how we think theoretically about the occurrence of domestic war as well 
as how we specify our empirical tests.  It will also have important implications for what we think the 
benchmark for our analyses should be, i.e. for what we think defines periods of peace as opposed to 
conflict.  Further, thinking about political conflict in general will allow some probing into the 
dynamic of conflict escalation. 
The older quantitative literature on violence pays little attention to the types of violence, how they are 
causally different and how they lead to different outcomes (Mueller and Weede 1990).  The more 
recent literature on civil wars, however, completely divorces the war outcome from the overall 
phenomenon of political violence.
2  The literature implies that civil war is not an outcome that can be 
neatly isolated in our analytical work, but few studies have undertaken a serious theoretical and 
empirical analysis of organized political violence (Sambanis 2006 on terrorism is an exception).   For 
example, embedding the study of civil war into the larger process of organized political violence is 
consistent with Fearon’s (2004, pp. 289) view that “both coups and peripheral insurgencies are 
strategies for using violence to take power.”  However, similar to the recent literature, Fearon is 
interested only in those coups that have de facto developed into civil wars, though the potential exists 
for all coups (attempted or successful) to grow into a large-scale war.  In addition, to the extent that 
violence escalates from low to high levels (e.g. Sambanis, 2004; Reagan and Norton, 2005; O’Brien, 
2002), lower levels of violence can be thought of as yet another non-peaceful strategy to press for 
political change.  Finally, Sambanis 2004 reviews the main approaches and results of the study of 
civil war.  Supporting the importance of our approach, Sambanis notes: “If we cannot understand 
why we get civil war instead of other forms of organized political violence, then we do not 
understand civil war at all” (Abstract).  He goes on to write that: “For many countries caught in a 
conflict trap, civil war is a phase in the cycle of violence.  By isolating civil war in quantitative 
studies, we choose to focus on an event rather than a process, and we discard a lot of useful 
information that explains how we end up having a civil war” (pp. 268).   
                                                 
2 The empirical literature in this tradition includes Cederman and Girardin 2007, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 
Ellingsen 2000, Reynal-Querol 2003, Sambanis 2001 and 2004.   4
In our theory section we show that the combinations of low income (or major shocks to the economy) 
and low standards of democracy are likely to be associated with high probability of violence, 
regardless of the social characteristics of a society and for all types of political violence.  Further we 
argue that because existing lines of identity and contestation will provide motivational and 
informational advantages to potential rebel leaders to grow a rebel organization, social 
fractionalization will be most likely associated with civil war.  Also, fractionalization does not 
necessarily affect coup and low intensity violence, because coups require other type of organizational 
advantages (insider presence in the police and military) and lower levels of violence tend to be more 
random and lack coherent organization. 
Subscribing to this simple and, hopefully, intuitive theoretical framework, our paper uses a 
multinomial logit empirical specification, in which the manifestations of violence range from lower 
intensity armed violence to coups and civil wars.  If civil war is just one of the alternative expressions 
of violent contestation of political power, a multinomial model is more appropriate than the use of 
logit or probit models.   Also, a multinomial framework is more appropriate than a bivariate model of 
domestic conflict (civil war, coups and armed violence lumped together) because it recognizes that 
different forms of conflict may have different determinants (Reagan and Norton 2005, O’Brien 
2002).    To investigate the determinants of conflict, we estimate a family of encompassing 
multinomial regressions using a global database from 1950 to 1999, accounting for three types of 
domestic violence (civil wars, coups and other violent outcomes) as well as a host of “grievance” and 
“opportunity” variables commonly analyzed in the recent empirical literature.    
 
2. Theory   
We argue that civil war is but one, albeit extreme, manifestation of a continuum of conflicts within a 
society that could also take the shape of cooperative or non-cooperative but peaceful outcome as well 
as violent non-cooperative outcomes.  In addition to civil war, the latter would include coups as well 
as violent riots, demonstrations and uprisings.  We try to justify this view of conflicts by addressing 
two issues: what makes some societies more prone to conflicts than others; and, given that a country 
or a society is inherently conflictive, what are the factors that favor certain type of conflicts?
3 
 
2.1  What makes some societies more prone to conflicts than others? 
                                                 
3 Some recent work attempts to link civil wars to other forms of violence and implies the existence of a 
relationship between civil wars and the larger phenomenon of domestic violent conflict.  The hypothesis that 
civil war is nested in the larger violent conflict phenomenon is, however, unclear theoretically and in the 
empirical specifications (Bates 1999, Ellingsen 2000, Regan and Norton 2005).    5
To address the first issue we extend the political economy literature emphasizing social conflicts and 
polarization as a reason for inefficient economic outcomes to the case of violent outcomes.  In 
particular, we draw on Rodrik 1998 and Caselli and Coleman 2006 to develop a stylized model of 
conflict that highlights the role of political institutions and “latent” social conflict in explaining why 
socially heterogeneous societies that lack functioning democratic institutions are likely to be exposed 
to violent conflict.   
Following Caselli and Coleman, we assume two socially distinct coalitions: A and B, with A being 
the larger and also the stronger group.   Group sizes are  A N  and, respectively,  B N , where 
N N N B A = + and A B N N < .  Members in a given group are assumed to be identical; each has an 
initial exogenous income stream from assets that cannot be expropriated ( B A y and y ).  Society 
members from both groups have equal shares (z =Z/N) from the aggregate common wealth (Z).  We 
use a follow-leader game, where group A makes the first move on whether or not to mount an 
opportunistic grab on the common resource Z and internalize the benefits to its members only.  
However, unlike Caselli and Coleman, we do not rule out that the weaker group (B) might choose to 
fight, which will result in conflict.  Moreover, we assume that the decision by group B on whether to 
fight or to capitulate depends on its prior about the probability that group A would mount an 
opportunistic grab on Z, which is given by the extent of ethnic fractionalization in society (π ).  Also 
unlike Caselli and Coleman, we assume that if group B decides to capitulate the ex-post outcome will 
depend on the strength of society’s institutions for conflict management (in short democracy).  Under 
well-established democratic rules, groups will eventually be forced to play by the rules and the 
common resource (net of the cost of conflict) will be equally distributed among all members of the 
society.  On the other hand, when such institutions are weak, all of Z (net of the cost of conflicts) will 
be expropriated by group A.  Moreover, the strength of conflict management institutions tends to 
moderate the potential inequities arising from the symmetric claims.  This feature of the model 
borrows from Rodrik 1998, who develops a model of social conflicts arising from coordination 
failure, with two social groups acting independently and facing a shrinking pie as a result of an 
external shock.  In the Rodrik model, depending on a prior opinion about whether the rival group is 
likely to be “cooperative”, each group will attach a high probability to an opportunistic grab of 
resources by its rival.  Therefore, ceteris paribus, the game results in higher claims than available 
resources, leading to distributional conflicts and strong conflict management institutions moderate the 
conflict arising from the symmetric claims by credible rules that govern the ex post distribution of 
resources.      6
We specify the per capita pay-off for each group under the peace-peace (PP); conflict-conflict (CC) 
and conflict-capitulation (CP) outcomes: 
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Where, for simplicity, we assume the cost of conflict to be the same when group B decides either to 
fight or capitulate in response to a conflictive move by group A.
4  Accounting for the ex-ante 
perception by group B on whether or not group A will mount an opportunistic grab (respectively 
given by π and π − 1 ), we can derive the expected payoffs of peace (P) and of conflict (C) strategies 
for each group (See Figure). 
Group A Strategy: 
The expected value of peace for this group happens with probability 1 because group B (the weaker 
group) is assumed to prefer peace; conditional on group A’s decision to avoid wresting control of the 
common assets Z.   Therefore, it is simply given by: 
(4)  z y P EV A
PP
A
A + = = μ ) (  
On the other hand, the expected value of conflict for group A would depend on group B’ reaction as 
well as the strength of the prevailing institutions for mediating conflicts: 
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The second term on the RHS of the above equation assumes the strength of the prevailing institution 
to be a weighted average of the two extremes: 
s w w w I I I ). 1 ( . φ φ − + = , whereI is weakest (strongest) when  1 = w φ ( 0 = w φ ). 
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Proposition 1: for Group A the conflict strategy will dominate if and only if: 
(7.1)  ) ( ) ( P EV C EV
A A > , or 
                                                 
4 When group B decides to capitulates only minor or even non-violent conflict should be envisaged, hence its 
cost should be lower than when group B decides to challenge the attempted resource grab by group A.  
However, it can be shown that the general qualitative results will not change if we assume different cost 
implications.    7
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Group B Strategy: 
For group B the expected value of peace would depend on group A’s strategy as well as well as the 
strength of the prevailing institutions, should group A chose to mount a grab on the appropriable 
assets (Z): 
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As before, using the expressions in (2.1)-(3) in (8) and collecting terms we have: 
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On the other hand, the expected value of conflict for the case B is conditional on group A choosing to 
mount a grab on Z.  Therefore, it is simply given by: 
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Proposition 2: for Group B the conflict strategy will dominate if and only if: 
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Proposition 3: Under perfectly strong conflict management institutions ( s w I I = = & 0 φ ), such as 
the case of well functioning democracies, peace will be the dominant strategy for both groups at all 
levels of π (follows from 7.2 & 11.2).   
Proposition 4: Conflict will be a dominant equilibrium strategy if and only if: 
(12)  ) , (
B A
w Max φ φ φ > .  
This suggest that when institutions are less than perfect, there exist reservation institutional level for 
each group ( s
A
w
A A I I I ) 1 ( φ φ − + = , s
B
w
B B I I I ) 1 ( φ φ − + = ); and that when the prevailing 
institution for conflict management is weaker than the minimum of the two reservation levels, 
conflict will be the dominant strategy for both groups.   
Proposition 5: Characterizing the functional dependence of the reservation weights (associated with 
the reservation institutional setting for groups A and B) suggests the following (7.3 & 11.3):   8
• The higher the intensity of violence (as reflected by the extent of destruction of assetsδ ) the 
weaker the reservation institutions required by both groups, i.e. the higher
B A φ φ & . 
This result suggests that onset of civil wars might require much weaker institutions than coups; and 
that other forms of low-intensity violence might happen even in the presence of strong institutions. 
• The larger the weight of human capital and other types of non-appropriable assets relative to the 




y B A , ), the weaker the reservation institutions for both groups for 
conflict to be the dominant strategy.   
This follows because for group A the gain from the resource grab will be small relative to the forgone 
non-appropriable income due to the destruction effect.  However, if institutions are so weak and it 
chooses to initiate a conflict, the likelihood of an equitable ex-post distribution of Z will be very 
small, thus making the expected payoff large enough to favor a conflict strategy.   On the other hand, 
for group B a very low weight for asset Z will make a capitulation strategy that avoids violent 
conflict more attractive than contesting an opportunistic grab by group A, unless institutions are so 
weak to the extent that the likelihood for an equitable ex-post distribution of Z is very remote.   In 
this case the payoff for B from a conflict strategy could be higher.  
• When group B is too small relative to A, the latter is less likely to initiate a conflict by attempting 
to wrest control of Z unless institutions are extremely weak. 
This result follows because the per capita gain for group A from this grab will be too small, unless 
institutions are weak enough to ensure that, ex-post, it can deprive group B from all or most of the Z 
assets. 
• Group A’s reservation level will be higher the more fractionalized the society (i.e. highπ ); while 
group B’s level will be lower.   
In societies with high latent social conflicts, group B is likely to contest a conflictive opportunistic 
grab of assets Z on the part of group A.  This will mean that the payoffs for A from the conflict 
strategy will be smaller unless countered by the effect of sufficiently weak institutions that would 
minimize the chance for an ex-post equitable distribution of Z.  On the other hand, high degree of 
“latent” conflict would reduce the payoff for B from capitulation to group A’s conflictive strategy 
unless compensated by relatively strong institutions that would increase the chances of an ex-post 
equitable distribution of Z.  
To summarize, the above model provides a theory for grievance factors, namely social 
fractionalization and democracy, as determinants of political violence.   Moreover, our model 
illuminates the interaction between these grievance factors and non-appropriable income and natural 
resources.  The latter two “economistic” correlates have been the main stable of the recent large N   9
empirical models of the risk of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003).  Our 
theory, therefore, suggest that both grievance as well as economic factors are relevant to the analysis 
of political violence.  The failure of the civil war empirical literature to account for this theory, we 
will argue, is the failure of this literature to model civil war as part of an evolving process of political 
violence.  Having analyzed the factors determining political conflict in general, next we discuss a set 
of hypotheses on the manifestation of political violence, namely riots/uprising, coups, and civil wars.  
 
2.2  What are the factors that favor certain type of conflicts? 
From the above model we infer that the combinations of low incomes (or major shocks to the 
economy) and low standards of democracy are likely to be associated with high probability of violent 
conflict, regardless of the social characteristics of a society.    
Higher income per capita will decrease all violent and irregular contestation of political power, but 
will have the strongest effect on civil war.  In the literature, high income reduces the risk of civil war 
both because richer states have a greater capacity to react to nascent rebellions (Fearon and Laitin 
2003) and because in richer states the opportunity costs of rebellion are larger (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004).  Coups d’etat on the other hand are likely to be affected by income per capita only to the 
extent to which it proxies the capacity of the central government for administration, policing and 
control of the military (Londregan and Poole 1990).   Further, Regan and Norton 2005 argue that 
initial mobilization and low levels of violence involve low costs and low levels of repression from the 
government.  They also suggest that no side payments may be needed and grievance may be enough 
to observe low levels of violence.  If government reaction to low levels of violence is not on a 
massive scale, then per capita income levels as a measure of government reaction capacity is not 
highly relevant. 
If grievance factors are sufficient to observe low levels of violence (Reagan and Norton 2005), then 
democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflict associated with it are strongly related with lower 
levels of violent protest (Tilly 2003).  We also expect a strong relationship between democracy and 
fewer coups d’etat as the lack of legitimacy of a current regime makes coups more likely (Belkin and 
Shoefer 2003).  Reagan and Norton 2005 argue that a full-scale revolt equivalent to civil war has high 
costs and there is expectation of government repression.  This leads to the need for rebel leaders to 
provide selective benefits.  Still, in democratic societies the use of violence or threats of violence is 
considered illegitimate as a means of resolving conflicts and democratic institutions and norms seek 
to replace force with peaceful mechanisms such as voting and the courts.  Our expectation is then that 
credible democracy reduces the likelihood of civil war as well.  However, we suggest that the effect   10
will be weaker since state repression may require side payments in addition to grievance motives 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Reagan and Norton 2005).  Following is the first testable hypothesis: 
H1: Low income per capita and weak institutional capacity for conflict management (i.e. lack of 
functioning democracy) are associated with violent conflict. 
Next, we address what determine the type of violence, given that a society or a country is inherently 
prone to violence.   We argue that for each type of violence there are certain “opportunities” or 
“favorable” conditions that determine the manifestation of violence in one type or another.    
While rebel groups in civil wars do not need a very large number of members as support basis 
(Fearon and Laitin) they still need a level of support that would make them transcend the status of a 
terrorist network, or of an unorganized mob. Gurr 2000 notes that mobilization depends on the 
availability of collective identities, shared motivations, and opportunities for collective action.  We 
hypothesize that because of the kind of entrenched, built-in support rebels can find within ethnic, 
religious, or language groups, large-scale civil wars will tend to develop in socially fractionalized 
societies.  Socioeconomic grievance (Gellner 1983) or political grievance (Wimmer 2002) can 
contribute to the articulation of group shared motivations and collective action.  We suggest therefore 
that socially fractionalized societies are likely to harbor grievances against the ruling elites and, in 
such societies, there are more opportunities for would-be rebel leaders to emerge or manipulate a 
larger number of aggrieved communities.  Fearon and Laitin 2003 posit an information mechanism 
instead of our grievance explanation of the effect of fractionalization on civil war: Rebel groups take 
advantage of “local knowledge” and dense social networks in ethnic groups to credibly enforce 
punishment for denunciation (p. 80).  Moreover, Caselli and Coleman 2006 argue that if countries are 
ethnically heterogeneous, coalitions can be formed along ethnic lines, where ethnic identity 
(particularly visible, unalterable identifiers like skin color or height) can be used as a marker to 
recognize potential infiltrators.  By lowering the cost of enforcing membership in the winning 
coalition, ethnic diversity makes it less susceptible to ex-post infiltration by members of the losing 
party.  Therefore a “strong” ethnic group finds it more profitable to bid for a country’s resources in an 
ethnically heterogeneous country.  Caselli and Coleman argue then that we should observe more 
conflict over resources in ethnically heterogeneous societies.  Even if our grievance-based 
mechanism or, instead, the ones posited by Fearon and Laitin and Caselli and Coleman apply, we 
should still expect ethnic fractionalization to increase the chance of civil wars.  However, if social 
fractionalization is related to civil wars for reasons of grievance, informational advantages or 
technology of exploitation – we place the burden of distinguishing between motivations on the 
political regime variable.  In particular, if grievance is part of the motivation for civil war onset, we 
contend that political institutions that allow for broad-based participation and do not discriminate   11
along traditional ethnic lines have the potential to mitigate the deleterious effect of social 
heterogeneity on civil war. 
At the other extreme, mounting a coup requires that the perpetrators are not locked-out from the 
formal state institutions of violence, such as the army and the police.   While leaders in countries with 
a high risk of coup may stack their militaries with loyalists, including members of their ethnic group, 
we do not expect that social fractionalization increases the risk of coup d’etat.  If social 
characteristics affect in any way the likelihood of coup d’etat we expect this to happen through 
indexes of polarization.  To the extent that it is costly to discriminate against large minorities and 
members of such minorities are present in the formal institutions of the state, the strategy of mounting 
a coup is available to large minorities.  It is more likely then, that countries experience coups or coup 
attempts in situations when large minority groups face an ethnic majority, i.e. in polarized societies.   
Finally, low levels of violence in the form of violent demonstrations or riots may have an element of 
randomness and lack of coherent coordination attached to them (Tilly 2003).  The motivation for 
lower levels of violence can be very different and can activate a wide range of collective boundaries 
from whole nations, special interests, religious and ethnic groups, local communities to workers in 
different industries or sectors.  Therefore, if individual grievance has the major role in mobilization at 
low levels of violent manifestations of conflict (Reagan and Norton 2005), it is possible but not 
necessary that mobilization takes place along lines of social fractionalization.    
If our analysis is correct, the following hypotheses follow: 
H2: Given that a society is inherently ripe for violence, social fractionalization will be most likely 
associated with civil war.  Existing lines of identity and contestation will provide motivational and 
informational advantages to potential rebel leaders to grow a rebel organization.  Fractionalization, 
on the other hand, does not necessarily affect coup and riots, because coups require other type of 
organizational advantages and lower levels of violence tend to be more random and lack coherent 
organization. 
 
3.   A Multinomial Model of Conflict 
In our theoretical account, armed conflict, coups and civil war are specific, alternative outcomes of an 
underlying weak state structure that is unable to solve peacefully, credibly and forcefully conflicts 
among various groups. To test this view of domestic conflict we need a multinomial model.  That is 
we need to specify a model compatible with a single decision being made amongst more alternatives 
as opposed to a model that is the solution to a problem in which there are several decisions, each 
between two alternatives (Green 2003, pp. 719).  Obviously, war, coups or riots are not choices, but 
outcomes of the interaction of the different domestic societal actors.   Applying Green’s terminology   12
of choices and decisions to our theoretical problem, we need a model that is able to encompass the 
realization of specific outcomes of the same propensity for civil strife.   
 
3.1  The Multinomial Logit Model 
As the estimation method, we choose an unordered multinomial logit model with four outcomes: 
violent riots/uprisings, coups, civil war and a “peace” or “no new conflict” outcome (the reference 
category).  A series of binomial logit regressions side by side can be specified instead of a 
multinomial.
5  However, in order to compare the effect of the independent variables on alternative 
outcomes, the binomial logit regressions need to have the same reference category (the 0 outcome in 
the dependent variable).  Reagan and Norton (2005) write that they “view civil conflict as a process 
that has discrete levels or breakpoints.  These begin with low levels of protest and proceed through 
higher levels of rebellion and, finally, if not sufficiently addressed, to civil war” (pp.326).   This view 
of civil conflict is similar to our own description of armed conflict, coups and civil wars as alternative 
manifestations of non-peaceful political contestation.  In terms of the research design, Reagan and 
Norton study the determinants of civil wars in a logit regression in which the dependent variable 
takes the value of 1 for all country years of war incidence.  All other data points are coded as the 
reference outcome 0.  The reference category for civil war then includes instances of peace, protest 
and rebellion.  Further, for the logit regression on rebellion outcomes, the reference category for 
rebellion includes peace, protest and war.  Given the lack of a common reference category for the 
three civil conflict outcomes, it is inappropriate to interpret the results in a comparative fashion.  
Further, if all the alternative manifestations of conflict have some common determinants, then it is 
likely that a multinomial model will be able to identify the common determinants better than a simple 
probit or logit on the civil war outcome.  In particular, the multinomial setting allows easy testing of 
hypotheses regarding the size of estimated coefficients for variables of interest for all three outcomes: 
riots, coups, civil wars.   
The benefits of the multinomial logit are that it is inexpensive to estimate, and the formula for the 
logit probabilities is easy to interpret when compared to other choice models (Train 1993).  The one 
weakness of the multinomial logit is the assumption that the random disturbance terms in the 
equations for each alternative are identically and independently distributed in accordance with the 
extreme value distribution.  This assumption (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) is 
inappropriate when the disturbances of a subset of the outcomes are correlated due to some similar 
                                                 
5 The assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) in the multinomial logit allows the 
estimation on subsets of alternatives (Train 1993, pp. 20).  However, the estimation sample needs to be adjusted 
to exclude those observations for which the chosen alternative is not in the estimation subset.    13
unobservable characteristics or omitted variables.  Possible remedial methods that we also try are the 
estimation of a nested logit (selective relaxation of the IIA assumption) or a multinomial probit 
(correlation of disturbance is allowed across the board).  Substantively, the assumption of the nested 
logit that the error terms for the war, coup and armed violence outcomes are correlated is very 
attractive.  Theoretically, it is likely that the three types of onset of domestic conflict are correlated 
through some unobservable factors, or factors that we are unable to measure.  However, upon 
estimating variants of the nested logit model, likelihood ratio tests are unable to support the use of the 
nested logit versus the simpler multinomial logit.  Finally, the results of our multinominal logit 
models are robust to running a multinomial probit instead. 
 
3.2 Data   
The Dependent Variable  
The data for the civil war alternative of the multinomial is from Sambanis 2004 (version b of the civil 
war variable).  Coups (attempted and successful) come from Belkin and Schofer 2003 and violent 
domestic protest is identified from the Banks Cross National Time Series Data Archive.  The unit of 
observation in the data is country year.  
Sambanis 2004 provides a lengthy and comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in coding 
civil war.  Central to his definition, wars are “fought by well organized groups with political agendas, 
challenging the sovereign authority and violence was reciprocal” (pp.820).  In addition wars should 
pass a relatively high, but flexible threshold with respect to the number of deaths resulting from the 
conflict.  We adopt Sambanis’ coding of civil war onset including onsets that occur in countries with 
an already ongoing civil war, which gives us 144 distinct war onsets from 1945 to 1999.
6 
Belkin and Schofer 2003 use a new data set of attempted and successful coups.  There are 204 
successful coups and 171 attempts between 1945 and 2000.  Generally, countries have had only one 
coup in a year, either successful or just attempted: 348 cases.  Still, there are years when countries 
experienced two attempts or two successful coups: 25 cases.  Finally, Syria is the one country with 
three successful coups in 1949 and three attempts in 1975.  
To operationalize low intensity organized violence we use the variable riots from the CNTS Data 
Archive.  Riots are defined as any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving 
the use of physical force.  For each year the original data sets counts the total number of riots that has 
occurred in that particular year.  Most countries experience no riots (83% of country years) and less 
than 5% of country years have more than two riots each year.  There are some outliers still: For 
example, in 1967 the US is documented with 55 riots, and India with 29.  We transform the original 
                                                 
6 The Sambanis 2004 Civil War Coding Notes codes the Burmese communist insurgency as starting in 1948.    14
riot data into a binary variable, taking the value of 1 for country years with riots and 0 for country 
years with no riots.
7  
For constructing a multinomial dependent variable we need to decide on how to treat country that 
experience multiple outcomes in a particular year.  For example, El Salvador experienced a 
successful coup in 1979, which is also the year the civil war has started.  Pakistan in 1971 
experienced both a coup and the onset of a civil war.  Also, Argentina saw both riots and a successful 
coup d’etat in 1962, 1966, 1970, 1971 and 1976.  While our outcomes are not ordered to the extent 
that we could estimate an ordered probit model, there is still a gradation in the amount of damage our 
outcomes inflict both on the legitimacy of the political process and on people’s lives.
8   We rank war 
as the most damaging outcome, followed by coups and then riots.  Thus, if a country experienced 
either a coup or riots and the onset of a war in the same year we code the multinomial alternative as a 
war.  Also, if a country experienced both riots and a coup we code the multinomial alternative as a 
coup. The multinomial dependent variable, then, has 144 war onsets, 319 coups and 1064 years with 
low intensity conflict.  
Independent Variables 
The explanatory variables we use are similar to those in Sambanis 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, and 
Collier and Hoeffler 2001.  All independent variables are from the Sambanis 2004 replication data 
set, with the exception of coups (Belkin and Schofer 2003), the polarization measures (Reynal-Querol 
2002) and the democracy variables (Polity  IV).   
Democracy; Anocracy; Autocracy 
Our novel theoretical approach to the study of violence is accompanied by a strong interest in re-
assessing the role that grievance factors – social fractionalization and lack of a fully functional 
democracy– play in the onset of political violence.    We investigate the effect of democratic 
governance and practices on political violence by using a more nuanced operationalization of 
democracy than the literature on civil wars has done so far.   We use the typology of democracy put 
forward by Goldstone et al.2005 in their study of political instability.   Specifically, we follow 
Goldstone et al. and rely on two underlying components of the Polity score: The measure of 
executive recruitment (exrec) and the competitiveness of political participation (parcomp).
9   A 
                                                 
7 The riot variable from CNTS Data Archive is less than ideal.   We would prefer to be able to discriminate 
between large and small violent clashes or demonstrations, but, to our knowledge, no such variable is readily 
available.  
   
8 We do not use an ordered model because due to the nature of the data, events in two of our categories – riots 
and coups - are relatively heterogeneous.   
9 There are multiple criticisms of the use of Polity IV –10 to 10 scale: Goldstone et al. discover that working 
with the components of the Polity IV scale better predicts instances of political instability.   Gleditsch and Ward 
1997 argue that the –10 to 10 scale should not be treated as a cardinal, or even as an ordinal measure.    15
combination of these two components has the best predictive ability in Goldstone et al. and, 
moreover, reflects the degree to which the political system allows societal actors to translate their 
preferences into policy with the help of peaceful mechanisms such as voting and elections.  The 
upshot is that meaningful elections will decrease the appeal of violent means of political contestation.    
Figure 1 (Appendix) shows the classification of political regimes along the lines of executive 
recruitment [Show the ways superordinates come to occupy their positions (Polity IV manual pp. 19)] 
and the competitiveness of political participation [Refers to the extent to which alternative 
preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena (Polity IV manual pp. 25)].  
Full autocracies involve repressed political participation and no leader elections.  Partial autocracies 
involve either some degree of competitive political participation or elections for the executive, but 
not both.  Partial democracies see some degree of political participation and election of political 
leaders.  However, only full democracy is characterized by both competitive elections of leaders and 
fully competitive political participation.  Further, we distinguish partial democracies that are 
characterized by factional politics, i.e. “polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that 
regularly compete for political influence to promote particularist agendas that favor group members 
to the detriment of common, secular and cross-cutting agendas” (Polity IV manual pp. 26).  We 
choose to treat interregnum periods (code –77) and transition periods (code –88) as distinctive 
categories, as they are characterized either by the collapse of the state or by fluidity between 
characteristics of new and old regimes.  Similar to other studies of civil war, we treat interruption 
periods (code –66) as missing data.   In our estimations of political violence, democracy variables are 
lagged one year and the reference category is autocracies.  
Social fractionalization; Ethnic, Religious, Language 
We use measures from Fearon 2003 and Fearon and Laitin 2003 to capture the degree of 
fractionalization of societies: ethnic (ef), religious (relfrac), and linguistic (numlang).   We also use 
polarization measures from Reynal-Querol 2002 to test the potentially non-linear effect of social 
diversity.  Finally, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that ethnic dominance increases the chances of 
civil war and we employ two measures of ethnic and religious dominance (dummy variables that take 
the value of 1 if the largest ethnic / religious group is between 45 and 90 percent of the population).   
History of conflict 
Thinking about conflict as the irregular contestation of political power allows some probing into the 
dynamic of conflict escalation.   For example, in countries with a history of coups, leaders are afraid 
of powerful actors in the military and will actively try to weaken the armed forces by dividing them 
into rival organizations that check and balance each other.  We believe that accounting for a country’s 
history and risk of coup d’etat is a more direct measure of the potentially inefficient use of the   16
military than income per capita and, thus, a better proxy for a weak state in the sense of Fearon and 
Laitin 2003.  Also, frequent violent riots will legitimize the use of force as a tool for pressing for 
political outcomes and could train potential future rebel leaders (Tilly 2003).  To test hypotheses 
about conflict escalation, our empirical models would have to account for countries’ history of 
violence: We include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country experienced a coup in 
the past five years (priorcoup5years), we count the number of years with riots in the past 5 years 
(priorviolence5years) and include a dummy variable measuring whether a civil war was ongoing in 
the previous year (warpastyear).  
Controls 
Lagged GDP/capita (gdpenl) is expected to reduce the likelihood of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 
2003,  Collier and Hoeffler 2001).  GDP/capita has also been shown to reduce the risk of coups 
(Belkin and Schofer 2003, Londregan and Poole 1990).  We use the natural log of the income per 
capita variable, as we can expect that income increases make a larger difference for poorer countries.  
In addition, the log of lagged population (lpopl1) and political instability (instab) (Fearon and Laitin 
2003, Hegre et al. 2001) have been shown to significantly affect the onset of civil wars (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, Hegre et al. 2001).  We also control for countries that are oil exporters (oil), and are 
geographically mountainous (lnmtn), which are argued in Fearon and Laitin 2003 to increase the 
appeal of the insurgency technology.
10   
 
 
4.   Econometric Results 
In Table 1 we show the effect of political regime, social fractionalization on the onset of conflict.  We 
further investigate the effect of polarization in Table 3 (Appendix), and the robustness to an 
alternative definition of civil war in Table 4 (Appendix).  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 
for the onset of violent demonstrations, the value of 2 for coups, the value of 3 for the onset of civil 
wars and the value of 0 for periods with no new conflict.  The results for the independent variables 
are displayed distinctly for our three alternatives of domestic conflict: armed violence, coups and 
civil war.  Also, the effect of the each measure of social diversity (ethnic, religious, language) is 
determined in separate models. The results that we present come from a multinomial logit model, but 
are robust to a multinomial probit specification that allows for the correlation of the unobserved 
                                                 
10 In general the literature abstracts from controlling for neighborhood effects (except Murdoch and Sandler 
2004). One can imagine that war in a neighboring country will lower the economic prospects of that country, 
leading to migration and refugees, which will then worsen prospects in the domestic country, leading to 
increased chances of war. Similar to much of the literature, we control directly for many of the potential 
consequences of wars in neighboring countries (income, population, instability), and thus mitigate the effect of 
not directly controlling for neighborhood effects.   17
disturbances across outcomes.  Because we estimate the effect of the history of conflict, the 
estimation samples have 125 countries and go from 1951 to 1999. 
Generally, our results confirm the stylized facts of the empirical literature.  We find broad support for 
the hypothesis that richer countries experience less irregular and violent contestation of political 
power.  Countries with higher per capita income display a lower chance of spiraling into civil war or 
experiencing a coup.  Across our models, the effect is statistically significant for both coups and civil 
wars and substantively important:  A move from the bottom 25
th percentile in terms of GDP/capita to 
the 75
th percentile reduces the chances of a country experiencing a coup by about 30% and the 
chances of civil war by 50%.  The one year lagged value of income per capita does not appear to 
affect the likelihood of violence onset.  This result may be an artifact of the fact that the identification 
of violence onset is not as precise as we would like it to be.  We also find that populous countries are 
more prone to civil wars and violent demonstration, while at the same time being inconsequential for 
countries experiencing a coup.  In our models, oil significantly increases the chances of civil war in 
most of our specifications while leaving unaffected the chances of a coup or lower intensity violence.  
Other extractable resources (Reagan and Norton 2005: diamonds, other gem stones and opiates) are 
statistically insignificant, regardless of whether or not we include oil exports.  The presence of 
mountainous terrain leaves unaffected the likelihood of all manifestations of violence - civil wars, 
coups, and violent demonstrations.  
Democracy; Anocracy; Autocracy 
To ascertain the effect of the political power of meaningful elections we use the typology of 
democracy put forward by Goldstone et al.2005.  There are several important differences between our 
use of the Polity score and the prevalent specification from the literature.  First, our coding is more 
stringent with the requirements for full democracy and identifies fewer countries that have 
meaningful political participation and executive recruitment.  In our sample we have about 21% of 
observations that qualify as full democracies, while the ubiquitous truncation of the Polity score for 
values larger than 5 results in about 33% of observations being classified as democracies.   Second, 
Fearon and Laitin 2003 find that anocracies (Polity score in between 5 and –5 and regime 
interruptions (-77)) are more prone to experience civil wars than autocracies and that democracies 
(Polity score larger than 5) have the same risk as autocracies to experience civil wars.  Fearon and 
Laitin interpret their findings as evidence that anocracies have a higher risk of war because they are 
weak, incoherent regimes.  At the same time, the two authors dismiss the idea that democracies face a 
lower risk of civil war because of less discrimination and that autocracies also face a low risk of war 
because they specialize in repression (Hegre et al. 2001).  We believe Fearon and Laitin’s 
interpretation to be speculative and that the Polity data affords further testing.  In particular, we have   18
the anocracy category unbundled into factional partial democracy, non-factional partial democracy, 
partial autocracy, and transition and interregnum periods.  It is habitual for researchers to interpolate 
the Polity values for transition periods and code interregnum periods as anocracies (Polity score of 0).  
This practice, however, results in a loss of information and potentially biased inferences.  De facto, 
the practice results in assigning values characterizing normal politics to extraordinary periods that the 
Polity project researchers were reluctant or unable to place in their regular coding scheme.    
In our regressions the reference category for the political regime dummy variables are autocracies.  
Similar to Belkin and Schofer 2003 we find that democracies consistently reduce the chances for 
irregular takeover of power through coups.  Democracy is also found to negatively affect the 
likelihood of observing violent demonstrations, although the negative effect is not robustly 
statistically significant.
11  The most important finding, however, is that democracies are less likely 
than autocracies to experience civil wars.  The democracy coefficient is consistently negative and 
statistically significant or close to significance in many of our specifications.  Moreover, while 
democracy has been shown in the literature to reduce chances for civil war when compared to 
anocracies or semi-democracies, it is novel to show that a credible democracy granting full political 
rights may reduce the risk of civil war more efficiently than a repressive autocracy.
12   
Contrary to Fearon and Laitin, we find it not to be the case that all anocracies are weak political 
regimes.  While partial autocracies appear to be vulnerable to violent demonstrations or coups, non-
factional partial democracies are as strong as autocracies in their ability to contain all types of 
conflict.  Also, even partial autocracies do not have a higher risk of civil war onset than full-blown 
autocratic regimes.  The countries most vulnerable to conflict, from violent demonstrations to coups 
and civil wars are factional partial democracies.  Countries that are relatively open in the recruitment 
of leaders and political participation face a large risk of conflict, contingent on the presence of 
parochial or ethnic based political factions.  About 20% of the observations in our sample are partial 
democracies or countries with relatively open political contestation, of which about half engage in 
deeply factionalized competition.  Our findings cast doubt on the idea that anocracies are weak states 
because they combine a generally unstable mix of democratic and autocratic features.  Rather, the 
problem is a specific combination of institutional openness and political participation channeled 
through networks rooted in traditional identities. Also, our findings point to potential grievance 
                                                 
11 Our expectation has been that democratic politics has the strongest effect on low levels of conflict – riots or 
violent demonstrations in our operationalization.  The lack of robustness of the democracy variable is 
attributable to the heterogeneous nature of violent demonstrations in the Banks data set.  Arguably, very small 
scale scuffles with the police and large-scale demonstrations turned violent have different causes.  
12 The coefficients for the democracy dummy variable are negative but statistically insignificant if we use 
Fearon and Laitin’s definition of civil war.  With the Collier and Hoeffler definition of war there are no civil 
wars occurring in countries classified as democracies according to the Goldstone et al. approach.    19
motivations for conflict: By definition political factions promote particularistic agendas and favor 
group members.  Moreover much of the literature on Africa points to distribution of patronage 
resources according to ethnic division lines.
13  Our evidence shows that states with potentially 
discriminatory policies face larger chances of violent demonstrations, coups and civil wars.  Finally, 
transition and interregnum periods consistently increase the risk of violent demonstrations and civil 
wars.  On the other hand, political instability as defined by Fearon and Laitin 2003 is never 
statistically significant across our specifications.  Political instability takes the value of 1 when the 
Polity regime index has a three point or greater change in the previous three years.  Political 
instability also includes instances of transition and interregnum periods.  Our findings show that 
conflict is the result of extraordinary instability of the political regime.  Instability is still statistically 
insignificant if we recode it not to include transition and interregnum periods.  Our findings show that 
it is misleading to blame all types of political instability for increased propensity for conflict.  
Past history of conflict 
History is an important determinant of the amount and type of conflict we observe.  The following 
results hold robustly across all our specifications: Riots or violent demonstrations are connected with 
more riots in the future, as well as more coups and civil war.  Coups are associated with future coups 
and wars, yet, surprisingly, appear to reduce the likelihood of riots.  Also, countries at war are less 
likely to see violent demonstrations.  While previous work has shown that the risk of civil war 
increases in political instability, here we are able to show that two specific forms of instability of the 
political regime (coups and violent demonstration) matter for the risk of civil war.  
Belkin and Schofer 2003 summarize the consensus in the literature on coups: “When leaders are 
vulnerable to coups, they commonly counterbalance their militaries, that is they divide their armed 
forces into rival organizations that check and balance each other” (pp. 613).  Counterbalancing can 
involve creating additional (perhaps redundant) army branches so that no military faction controls 
large resources or setting up paramilitary units for the sole protection of the leader.
14  Belkin and 
Schofer also note that a good indicator of the threat of coups is whether the country has experienced a 
coup before.
15  Our evidence shows that countries that have a history of coups will be more likely to 
see rebel movements evolve into large-scale civil wars.  That is, the threat of coups and the resulting 
                                                 
13 See for example Posner 2007, Bates 1989 or van de Walle 1989.   
14 This behavior is consistent with the increase in military spending that Collier and Hoeffler 2006 predict 
should happen when the risk of coup runs high.  Collier and Hoeffler 2006, however, posit a different 
mechanism in which the leader does not have the upper hand to divide and conquer the military, but is being 
“blackmailed” into spending by the military.   
15 See also Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1992.  Belkin and Schofer 2003 use the history of coups over the previous 
ten years.    20
inefficient use of military resources make it both more likely for insurgents to rebel and for the 
government to have an inadequate response.   
Popular demonstrations involving violence may lead to further violence for a variety of reasons: 
Episodes of violence legitimize future violent contestation of power; Violent rioting and protest 
signals discontent and grievance; Participation in violent riots creates individual experience or even 
leadership in the practice of violence; Finally, some violent protest may elicit a similarly violent 
response on the side of the government, leading to cycles of violence and repression (Tilly 2003, 
Moore 1998).
16  While we cannot distinguish among these explanations, our evidence suggests that 
countries with a history of violent protest are at risk of coups and escalation of violence into civil 
war.   
Fractionalization and Polarization 
In Table 1 we show our basic results for ethnic, religious and language fractionalization.  Consistent 
with our story, all three types of fractionalization increase the risk of observing civil war and do not 
affect the other types of violent, irregular contestation of political power.  A move from the bottom 
25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile on language fractionalization or religious fractionalization 
increases the chances of war by about 70%.  A similar move for ethnic fractionalization increases the 
chances of war by 80%.  Fractionalization is unimportant for the other civil conflict outcomes, except 
that religious fractionalization has a substantively small, but statistically significant negative effect on 
the likelihood of violent demonstrations.  For the civil war outcome, ethnic fractionalization remains 
statistically significant when including religious fractionalization, language fractionalization or the 
number of languages.  Also, if included in the same regression model, both religious fractionalization 
and the number of languages are statistically significant.
17  If used instead of the number of 
languages, Reynal-Querol’s language fractionalization index is statistically significant at the 10% 
level.   Ethnic and religious dominance are statistically insignificant.  
In Table 3 (Appendix) we show the results for ethnic, religious and language polarization for each 
alternative manifestation of domestic conflict.  All three aspects of polarization have a weak 
performance in our regressions, supporting the hypothesis of a monotonic relationship between 
                                                 
16 Tilly 2003 writes: “Not all scattered attacks, however, remain contained and segmented. In principle, we may 
expect salience and coordination to increase, if political entrepreneurs or violent specialists join the action on 
either side” (pp. 187) or (about El Salvador 1980) “though the demonstrations and strikes gradually became 
smaller, there was a concomitant shift within the left opposition toward a military strategy” (pp. 39). 
17 We choose to present our results with only one measure of fractionalization included because of the way 
Fearon 2003 chooses to code ethnic groups, which includes sharing cultural features, such as a common 
language or religion.     21
ethnicity, religion, languages and domestic violent political conflict.
18  In Table 4 (Appendix) we 
show the estimates from our model when using the Laitin and Fearon definition of civil war.  Even 
with the different civil war data, ethnic fractionalization and the number of languages remain 
statistically significant.  Also, a move from the bottom 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile on ethnic 
fractionalization increases the chances of war by about 55%, while a similar move in the language 
fractionalization index increases the likelihood of war by 22%.
19 
From our estimations ethnic fractionalization appears to increase the prospects for civil war and leave 
unaffected the chances for other types of irregular contestation of power.  Also, as we discussed 
above, Fearon’s measure of ethnic fractionalization ef already incorporates cultural diversity along 
religious and language lines.   Therefore, at this stage, we focus on civil wars and ethnic 
fractionalization only and go on and estimate models with interactions of fractionalization and 
measures of democratic governance.  From the point of view of the developing world, full-fledged 
democracy is a long-term outcome.  In the short term, the best outcome of a transition to liberal 
democracy is what we have labeled as a partial non-factional democracy.  On the other hand, the 
worst outcome of such a transition would be a partial factional democracy, that is a country with open 
political participation and selection of leaders but a political discourse centered on ethnic, 
particularistic lines.  We interact then ethnic fractionalization with partial factional and non-factional 
democracy.  The coefficient of ethnic fractionalization remains positive and statistically significant.  
The interaction of ef and partial non-factional democracy is negative, and the interaction of ef and 
partial factional democracy is positive.  While partial factional democracy was statistically significant 
in all of our previous specifications, in the interacted model it loses significance.  A joint statistical 
significance test rejects the hypothesis that ef and all its interacted terms are indistinguishable from 
zero at the 10% probability level.   The predicted probabilities of civil war from the interacted model 
are shown in Table 5 (Appendix).   At low levels of ethnic fractionalization (25
th percentile) factional 
and non-factional partial democracies reveal a probability of civil war onset hovering around 2%.  
For high levels of ethnic fractionalization (75
th percentile), non-factional partial democracies lower 
the probability of civil war onset to about 1.3%, while partial factional democracies increase the same 
probability to about 4.6%.  Our results indicate that political liberalization with free and open 
elections is not a panacea and that, to insure peace, governments need to moderate favoritism and 
instead engage in a broad based society dialogue.  
                                                 
18 If we test ethnic polarization is a less taxing way and not include the ef index, we get results consistent with 
our hypotheses: Ethnic polarization significantly increases the chance of observing coups, while leaving 
unaffected the likelihood of civil war or riots.  Ethnic dominance continues to be statistically insignificant.  
19 In the online Supplement for “What is Civil War” (2004), Sambanis finds a similar results using the Fearon 
and Laitin 2003 data and dropping observations for new states, or more generally not using the first wars in the 
data set that are potentially left censored.     22
Social fractionalization 
We test the robustness of our findings for fractionalization in Table 2.  Our purpose is to isolate the 
most fractionalized societies along both ethnic and language lines and test whether countries face a 
coordination problem in waging civil war.  In particular, Collier and Hoeffler 2004 argue that 
fractionalized societies are safer than homogenous ones because of the difficulty faced by rebel 
organizations in maintaining cohesion if they need to span different social groups.  Figure 2 
(Appendix) shows the partition of the space of ethnic and language diversity.  Uniform (homogenous) 
societies have both indexes of language and ethnic fractionalization lower than the 25
th percentile of 
the whole sample.  There are 852 observations of uniform societies, and 2 wars (0.23% civil war 
onset rate).  Diverse societies have both indexes of language and ethnic fractionalization greater than 
the 75
th percentile of the whole sample.  There are 831 observations of diverse societies and 30 wars 
(onset rate of 3.6%).  We group together societies that are fairly diverse ethically (Ef greater than the 
25
th percentile and smaller than the 75
th percentile) and in terms of language composition (Qlf greater 
than the 25
th percentile and smaller than the 75
th percentile) and we label them as moderately diverse 
societies.  There are 1817 observations of moderately diverse societies and 33 wars (onset rate of 
1.8%).  Partially homogenous societies have either but not both of the Ef index or the Qlf index 
smaller than its respective 25
th percentile.  There are 1199 partially homogenous countries and 22 
wars (onset rate of 1.83%).  Partially diverse countries have either but not both of the Ef index or the 
Qlf index larger than its respective 75
th percentile.  There are 564 partially diverse countries and 12 
wars (onset rate of 2.13%). 
Table 2 shows the results from a multinomial logit that include measures of social fractionalization 
along both ethnic and language lines.  Contrary to Collier and Hoeffler 2001, our results suggest that 
social fractionalization is not benign.  The results for civil war show that ethnic and language 
diversity increase the chances that countries will experience domestic wars. The coefficient on 
diverse societies is positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient on homogenous societies 
is negative and statistically significant.  Moreover, by looking at the predicted probabilities, a diverse 
country is twice more likely to experience civil war than a moderately diverse country and more than 
three times more likely than a homogenous country.  Indeed, as Fearon and Laitin 1993 argue, it 
appears to be the case that rebel groups do not need large masses of people to start a bloody conflict 
and that the coordination problem posed by Collier and Hoeffler 2001 is not an important factor in 
the onset of civil war.  Also, ethnic dominance continues to be statistically insignificant contradicting 
the idea that majorities (groups that make 45%-90% of the population) necessarily have the ability 
and the incentive to exploit minorities (Collier 2001) and the idea of preemptive civil war initiated by 
large ethnic groups facing moderately large ethnic minorities (Caselli and Coleman 2006).    23
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we start by assessing the empirical support received by grievance motives in the onset of 
civil wars (political regime and social fractionalization measures).  By and large, the Collier-Hoeffler 
2004 and Fearon-Laitin 2003 contend that ethnic and religious diversity do not have deleterious 
effects on the propensity societies have to solve conflicts violently.  Fearon and Laitin also argue that 
anocracies are at a higher risk of war because they are incoherent, weak regimes combining features 
of both autocracies and democracies.  We believe that the subject is worth further investigation and 
propose a theory of domestic conflict in which low level armed violence, coups and civil war are 
specific, alternative outcomes of an underlying propensity to solve political conflict in a violent 
manner.  Our model provides a theory for grievance factors, namely social fractionalization and 
democracy, as determinants of political violence.  Moreover, our model illuminates the interaction 
between these grievance factors and non-appropriable income and natural resources.  Our theory 
suggests that both grievance as well as economic factors are relevant to the analysis of political 
violence.  The failure of the civil war empirical literature to account for this theory, we will argue, is 
the failure of this literature to model civil war as part of an evolving process of political violence.  
Faithful to our theoretical discussion, we specify and estimate a multinomial model of domestic 
conflict.  If the alternative manifestations of conflict have some common determinants, then it is 
likely that a multinomial model will be able to better identify the common determinants better than a 
simple probit or logit on the civil war outcome.  Also, a multinomial model recognizes that different 
forms of conflict may have different determinants. 
Following a battery of estimations and robustness checks we find that:  Not all anocracies are weak 
political regimes; Democracies may be more efficient than autocracies in reducing the risk of civil 
war; Not all political instability results in domestic war;  Ethnic, religious and language diversity 
(fractionalization) increases the chances of civil wars; Ethnic and religious dominance or polarization 
do not affect civil war; Social fractionalization (ethnically and linguistically diverse societies) does 
not increase coordination costs for rebel groups but, rather, increases the likelihood of war.   
To test the effect of political regime on the risk of violent conflict we use a typology of democracy 
based on the two components of the Polity score that deal with competitiveness of the political 
system at the leadership and mass levels.  We identify full-fledged democracies, partial non-factional 
democracies, partial factional democracies, partial autocracies and full-blown autocratic regimes.  
Our findings show that credible democratic regimes granting full political rights may reduce the risk 
of civil war more efficiently than repressive autocracy.  We also find that countries most vulnerable 
to conflict, from violent demonstrations to coups and civil war are partial factional democracies,   24
while partial non-factional democracies are not more risky than autocracies.  This finding casts doubt 
on the idea that anocracies are weak states because they combine an unstable mix of democratic and 
autocratic features.  Rather, we suggest that the problem is the combination of institutional openness 
and political participation channeled though networks rooted in traditional, ethnic identities.   
Political instability has been found in the literature to increase the risk of civil war.  Our empirical 
results challenge that finding and we suggest that specific types of instability are to blame.  In 
particular, our results show that violent conflict is the result of extraordinary political instability of 
the kind that the Polity project researchers were unable to place in their regular coding scheme.  We 
also show that the risk of civil war is increased by the political instability that results from a history 
of coups d’etat and a history of violent protests and demonstrations.  
Finally, we find that ethnic, religious and language fractionalization significantly increases the 
likelihood of civil war.  Ex ante we posited a grievance explanation to why fractionalization may 
increase the chances of civil war, while Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Caselli and Coleman 2006 argue 
for the informational value of ethnicity.  The unconditional effect of fractionalization cannot extend 
support to either mechanism in particular.  However, we interact ethnic fractionalization with the two 
types of partial democracy that are the most likely outcomes from a democratic transition in the 
developing world: partial non-factional democracy and partial factional democracy.  We find that 
partial democracy of the non-factional kind reduces the deleterious effects of fractionalization, while 
partial factional democracy exacerbates the effect of diversity.  We interpret our findings as evidence 
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Table 1. Ethnic, religious, and language fractionalization 
  Multinomial logit regression on armed violence, coup and civil war outcomes (Sambanis) 
 
  Multinomial 1  Multinomial 2  Multinomial 3 
  Riot  Coup  Civil war  Riot  Coup  Civil war  Riot  Coup  Civil war 
Log  lagged    0.11  -0.22**  -0.42*** 0.06  -0.38*** -0.42*** 0.04  -0.35*** -0.35** 
GDP/capita  (0.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.06) (0.11) (0.15) (0.07) (0.12) (0.17) 
Log  lagged  population  0.23*** -0.09  0.25*** 0.24*** -0.09  0.24*** 0.25*** -0.08  0.14 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) 
Oil  -0.17 -0.03 0.59**  -0.17 0.06  0.85***  -0.13 0.04  0.81*** 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.28) (0.15) (0.23) (0.27) (0.15) (0.23) (0.27) 
Log  of  mountainous    0.00 0.05 0.06 -0.02  0.03 0.08 -0.01  0.03 0.09 
terrain    (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) 
Instability  -0.05 -0.22 0.23  -0.05 -0.17 0.20  -0.07 -0.18 0.28 
  (0.14) (0.21) (0.31) (0.14) (0.20) (0.31) (0.14) (0.20) (0.31) 
Lagged transitional &  0.54* 0.55  1.27***  0.57**  0.47  1.29*** 0.55**  0.47  1.28*** 
interregnum  regimes  (0.28) (0.37) (0.45) (0.28) (0.37) (0.45) (0.28) (0.37) (0.45) 
Lagged democracy   -0.27*  -3.08***  -1.29  -0.23  -2.95***  -1.59**  -0.26  -3.05***  -1.45* 
  (0.16) (1.04) (0.81) (0.16) (1.04) (0.80) (0.16) (1.04) (0.80) 
Lagged  factional  0.41*** 0.56*** 0.74**  0.43*** 0.55*** 0.76**  0.43*** 0.54**  0.69** 
partial  democracy  (0.14) (0.21) (0.30) (0.14) (0.21) (0.30) (0.14) (0.21) (0.30) 
Lagged  non-factional  0.12  -0.13 -0.41 0.11  -0.16 -0.26 0.15  -0.11 -0.48 
partial  democracy  (0.16) (0.31) (0.48) (0.16) (0.31) (0.49) (0.16) (0.31) (0.51) 
Lagged partial   0.38*  0.72***  -0.46  0.33*  0.53**  -0.45  0.35*  0.61**  -0.52 
autocracy  (0.20) (0.25) (0.61) (0.20) (0.26) (0.60) (0.20) (0.25) (0.60) 
Coup in the past 5   -0.25*  1.26***  0.45*  -0.28**  1.21***  0.45*  -0.27**  1.24***  0.44* 
years  (0.13) (0.16) (0.26) (0.13) (0.16) (0.27) (0.13) (0.16) (0.26) 
Number  of  years  with    0.57*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.57*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.57*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 
riots in the past 5 
years 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) 
Civil war ongoing in 
the  
-0.24*  0.26  -0.36 -0.20 0.37**  -0.31 -0.21 0.34* -0.34 
past  year  (0.13) (0.19) (0.27) (0.13) (0.18) (0.28) (0.13) (0.18) (0.28) 
Ethnic    0.22 0.47 1.28**        
fractionalization  (0.18) (0.31) (0.51)       
Ethnic  dominance  -0.06 -0.05 0.09        
  (0.10) (0.18) (0.23)       
Religious      -0.40* -0.52  1.30**      
fractionalization      (0.23) (0.38) (0.56)      
Religious dominance     -0.04 -0.19 -0.15      
     (0.10) (0.17) (0.26)      
Number of languages        -0.01  -0.01  0.03** 
        (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Constant  -5.16*** -1.43  -4.20*** -4.63*** 0.36  -3.79*** -4.67*** -0.18  -3.33** 
  (0.59) (1.01) (1.43) (0.57) (1.00) (1.42) (0.58) (1.01) (1.35) 
Number of events in 
the sample 
835 210 91  835 216 92  835 216 92 
Observations 4231  4272  4272 
Log Likelihood  -2806  -2828  -2831 
 
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Results are robust if we include decade dummies or a cold war 
variable.  Ethnic fractionalization remains statistically significant when including religious fractionalization, language fractionalization or the 
number of languages.  If we use Reynal-Querol ‘s language fractionalization index it is statistically significant at the 10% level.  We prefer 
using the number of languages as the measure is available for a larger sample.  If included in the same regression model, both religious 
fractionalization and the number of languages are statistically significant.  Lagged full democracy is significant at the 11% probability level 
in the civil war component of the Multinomial 1 model.   28
Table 2.  Social diversity: Ethnic and language fractionalization (Sambanis war) 
 
  Multinomial – Social Fractionalization 
 Riot  Coup  Civil  war 
Log lagged GDP/capita  0.10 -0.22*  -0.31* 
  (0.07) (0.12)  (0.18) 
Log lagged population  0.23*** -0.08  0.19** 
  (0.03) (0.06)  (0.09) 
Oil  -0.18 -0.06  0.67** 
  (0.15) (0.23)  (0.29) 
Log of mountainous   0.01 0.03  0.10 
terrain   (0.03) (0.06)  (0.09) 
Instability  -0.12 -0.24  -0.01 
  (0.14) (0.22)  (0.35) 
Lagged transitional   0.47 0.29  1.45*** 
and interregnum regimes  (0.30) (0.42)  (0.52) 
Lagged democracy   -0.33** -3.10*** -1.33 
  (0.17) (1.04)  (0.83) 
Lagged factional  0.43*** 0.53**  0.87*** 
partial democracy  (0.15) (0.22)  (0.31) 
Lagged non-factional  0.11 -0.14 -0.28 
partial democracy  (0.16) (0.31)  (0.49) 
Lagged partial autocracy  0.35* 0.71** -0.18 
  (0.21) (0.28)  (0.62) 
Coup in the past 5 years  -0.25* 1.36*** 0.45 
  (0.14) (0.17)  (0.28) 
Number of years with   0.56*** 0.37***  0.29*** 
riots in the past 5 years  (0.03) (0.06)  (0.09) 
Civil war ongoing in the   -0.20 0.34*  -0.40 
past year  (0.13) (0.20)  (0.31) 
Partially  homogenous  0.13 -0.07 0.27 
  (0.13) (0.24)  (0.36) 
Partially  diverse  0.29* 0.20  0.21 
  (0.18) (0.27)  (0.43) 
Diverse   0.27 0.15  0.95* 
  (0.20) (0.32)  (0.51) 
Homogenous  0.32* -0.15  -1.64* 
  (0.18) (0.36)  (1.01) 
Ethnic dominance  0.13 0.03  0.16 
  (0.13) (0.23)  (0.34) 
Constant  -5.25*** -1.32  -4.20** 
  (0.65) (1.08)  (1.65) 
Number of events in 
the sample 
801 193  79 
Observations 3975 










   29
Appendix  
 
Table 3. Ethnic, religious, and language polarization 
  Multinomial logit regression on armed violence, coup and civil war outcomes (Sambanis) 
 
  Multinomial 1  Multinomial 2  Multinomial 3 
  Riot  Coup  Civil war  Riot  Coup  Civil war  Riot  Coup  Civil war 
Log lagged   0.09  -0.26**  -0.47***  0.04  -0.37***  -0.46***  0.05  -0.30**  -0.34* 
GDP/capita  (0.07) (0.12) (0.15) (0.06) (0.11) (0.17) (0.07) (0.12) (0.19) 
Log  lagged  population  0.23*** -0.09  0.26*** 0.24*** -0.07  0.24*** 0.23*** -0.07  0.14 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) 
Oil  -0.17 -0.02 0.62**  -0.15 0.06  0.89***  -0.14 -0.03 0.81*** 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.29) (0.15) (0.23) (0.29) (0.15) (0.23) (0.27) 
Log  of  mountainous    0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.01  0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.06 
terrain    (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) 
Instability  -0.06 -0.27 0.20  -0.08 -0.29 0.17  -0.12 -0.27 0.03 
  (0.14) (0.21) (0.31) (0.14) (0.21) (0.32) (0.14) (0.22) (0.34) 
Lagged transitional  &  0.60**  0.47 1.30***  0.63** 0.47  1.29***  0.48 0.35 1.43*** 
interregnum  regimes  (0.28) (0.39) (0.49) (0.28) (0.40) (0.48) (0.30) (0.41) (0.52) 
Lagged democracy   -0.27  -2.99***  -1.32  -0.24  -2.99***  -1.53*  -0.32* -3.09***  -1.34 
  (0.17) (1.05) (0.81) (0.16) (1.04) (0.81) (0.16) (1.04) (0.82) 
Lagged  factional  0.41*** 0.54**  0.81*** 0.42*** 0.58*** 0.80*** 0.41*** 0.51**  0.78** 
partial  democracy  (0.14) (0.22) (0.31) (0.14) (0.22) (0.31) (0.14) (0.22) (0.31) 
Lagged  non-factional  0.12  -0.15 -0.31 0.11  -0.15 -0.19 0.10 -0.12  -0.35 
partial  democracy  (0.16) (0.31) (0.50) (0.16) (0.31) (0.49) (0.16) (0.32) (0.52) 
Lagged partial   0.37*  0.77***  -0.37  0.31  0.63**  -0.37  0.30 0.68**  -0.23 
autocracy  (0.20) (0.26) (0.61) (0.20) (0.26) (0.61) (0.21) (0.28) (0.62) 
Coup in the past 5   -0.28**  1.24***  0.37  -0.31**  1.23***  0.38  -0.27**  1.34***  0.50* 
years  (0.13) (0.17) (0.28) (0.13) (0.17) (0.28) (0.14) (0.17) (0.28) 
Number  of  years  with    0.57*** 0.38*** 0.28*** 0.57*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.56*** 0.38*** 0.29*** 
riots in the past 5 years  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
Civil war ongoing in the   -0.26**  0.28  -0.37  -0.21  0.36*  -0.31  -0.17  0.33*  -0.32 
past  year  (0.13) (0.19) (0.29) (0.13) (0.20) (0.29) (0.13) (0.20) (0.30) 
Ethnic    0.36  0.13  1.60**        
fractionalization  (0.24)  (0.38)  (0.66)        
Ethnic  polarization  -0.16  0.58  -0.85        
  (0.28)  (0.45)  (0.76)        
Ethnic  dominance  -0.03  -0.14  0.30        
  (0.11)  (0.20)  (0.28)        
Religious       -0.44  -0.82  1.14*     
fractionalization     (0.27)  (0.51)  (0.61)     
Religious  polarization     0.14  0.28  0.40     
     (0.23)  (0.50)  (0.68)     
Religious  dominance     -0.07  -0.19  -0.28     
     (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.28)     
Number  of  languages        -0.00  -0.01  0.03** 
        (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Language  polarization        -0.44**  0.34  0.29 
        (0.19)  (0.33)  (0.57) 
Constant  -5.04*** -1.20  -3.64**  -4.52*** 0.05  -3.61**  -4.40*** -0.78  -3.60** 
  (0.59) (1.01) (1.45) (0.57) (1.02) (1.55) (0.60) (1.04) (1.60) 
Number of events in the 
sample 
824 203 85  824 203 85  801 193 79 
Observations 4139  4139  3971 
Log Likelihood  -2726.6  -2724.9  -2605.6 
 
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The reference category for regime dummy variables are autocracies.  
Polarization variables are not statistically significant even if we exclude measures of fractionalization.    30
Table 4. Ethnic, religious, and language fractionalization 
  Multinomial logit regression on armed violence, coup and civil war outcomes  
   Fearon and Laitin 2003 definition of civil war 
 
  Multinomial 1  Multinomial 2  Multinomial 3 
  Riot  Coup  Civil war  Riot  Coup  Civil war  Riot  Coup  Civil war 
Log  lagged    0.09  -0.18  -0.49*** 0.04  -0.34*** -0.52*** 0.03  -0.31*** -0.44** 
GDP/capita  (0.07) (0.11) (0.18) (0.06) (0.11) (0.18) (0.07) (0.12) (0.18) 
Log  lagged  population  0.24*** -0.09  0.29*** 0.25*** -0.09  0.26*** 0.25*** -0.09  0.20** 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) 
Oil  -0.21 -0.09 0.46  -0.22 -0.00 0.70**  -0.18 -0.02 0.70** 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.34) (0.15) (0.23) (0.33) (0.15) (0.22) (0.33) 
Log  of  mountainous    0.01 0.05 0.16 -0.01  0.03 0.16 -0.01  0.03 0.18* 
terrain    (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) 
Instability  -0.07 -0.17 -0.13 -0.07 -0.11 -0.16 -0.08 -0.13 -0.10 
  (0.14) (0.20) (0.36) (0.14) (0.20) (0.36) (0.14) (0.20) (0.36) 
Lagged transitional &  0.51*  0.50  1.40** 0.55** 0.42  1.44***  0.52* 0.42  1.45*** 
interregnum  regimes  (0.27) (0.36) (0.55) (0.28) (0.37) (0.55) (0.27) (0.36) (0.56) 
Lagged  democracy    -0.26 -3.12***  -0.93 -0.22 -3.00***  -1.10 -0.25 -3.09***  -1.06 
  (0.16) (1.04) (0.85) (0.16) (1.04) (0.83) (0.16) (1.04) (0.84) 
Lagged  factional  0.43*** 0.60*** 0.99*** 0.45*** 0.59*** 0.99*** 0.44*** 0.58*** 0.97*** 
partial  democracy  (0.14) (0.21) (0.34) (0.14) (0.21) (0.34) (0.14) (0.21) (0.33) 
Lagged  non-factional  0.13 -0.08  0.07 0.12 -0.11  0.13 0.16 -0.06  0.02 
partial  democracy  (0.16) (0.30) (0.51) (0.16) (0.31) (0.52) (0.16) (0.30) (0.53) 
Lagged partial   0.42**  0.73***  -0.03  0.37*  0.54**  -0.07  0.39**  0.63**  -0.11 
autocracy  (0.20) (0.25) (0.62) (0.20) (0.26) (0.61) (0.20) (0.25) (0.61) 
Coup in the past 5   -0.30**  1.29***  0.59*  -0.33**  1.24***  0.57*  -0.32**  1.26***  0.58* 
years  (0.13) (0.16) (0.30) (0.13) (0.16) (0.30) (0.13) (0.16) (0.30) 
Number  of  years  with    0.58*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.57*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.58*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 
riots in the past 5 
years 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) 
Civil war ongoing in 
the  
-0.20 0.19  -0.80**  -0.16 0.32  -0.71**  -0.15 0.28  -0.87** 
past  year  (0.13) (0.20) (0.36) (0.13) (0.20) (0.36) (0.13) (0.19) (0.40) 
Ethnic    0.23  0.48  1.03*        
fractionalization  (0.18)  (0.31)  (0.54)        
Ethnic  dominance  -0.07  -0.03  -0.01        
  (0.10)  (0.18)  (0.25)        
Religious       -0.41*  -0.48  0.62     
fractionalization       (0.23)  (0.38)  (0.69)     
Religious  dominance     -0.03  -0.22  -0.03     
     (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.31)     
Number  of  languages        -0.01  -0.01  0.03* 
        (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Constant  -5.12*** -1.74*  -4.43*** -4.56*** 0.04  -3.68**  -4.66*** -0.44  -3.68** 
  (0.59) (1.00) (1.61) (0.57) (0.99) (1.65) (0.58) (1.01) (1.56) 
Number of events in 
the sample 
844 211 67  844 217 68  844 217 68 
Observations 4231  4274  4274 
Log Likelihood  -2734  -2758  -2760 
 
Note:  The samples have 125 countries and go from 1951 to 1999.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The 
reference category for regime dummy variables are full autocracies. 
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Table 5.  Predicted probability of civil war  
Model: Ethnic fractionalization and its interactions with partial factional and non-factional      
democracy 
 
Predicted probability of civil war 
 Ef=0.21  Ef=0.5  Ef=0.7 
Partial non-factional 
democracy 
0.019 0.014 0.013 
Partial factional 
democracy 
0.023 0.033 0.046 
 
Note: Ef takes values for the 25
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Figure 1. Democracy; Anocracy; Autocracy 
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Note:  Dark orange = full autocracy; Red = partial autocracy; Light blue = factional partial democracy; Green= 
Non-factional partial democracy; Dark blue = full democracy. Based on Executive Recruitment (EXREC) and 
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP) variables in the Polity IV data set.  Table is from 
Goldstone et al. 2005.  Source: Goldstone et al. 2005.   Full democracies make 22% of observation in the sample.  
Factional partial democracies make 11% of observations and non-factional partial democracies about 9 %.   
Partial autocracies are about 6% of the sample.  Autocracies make about 48% of the observations in the sample.  
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Figure 2. Social diversity: Ethnicity and religion 
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Note: The figure shows the partition we use for capturing diversity along both ethnic and language lines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 